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Article
Meta-Knowledge of Culture 
Promotes Cultural Competence
Angela K.-y. Leung1, Sau-lai Lee2, and Chi-yue Chiu3
Abstract
A behavioral signature of cross-cultural competence is discriminative use of culturally appropriate 
behavioral strategies in different cultural contexts. Given the central role communication plays 
in cross-cultural adjustment and adaptation, the present investigation examines how meta-
knowledge of culture—defined as knowledge of what members of a certain culture know—
affects culturally competent cross-cultural communication. We reported two studies that 
examined display of discriminative, culturally sensitive use of cross-cultural communication 
strategies by bicultural Hong Kong Chinese (Study 1), Chinese students in the United States and 
European Americans (Study 2). Results showed that individuals formulating a communicative 
message for a member of a certain culture would discriminatively apply meta-knowledge of the 
culture. These results suggest that unsuccessful cross-cultural communications may arise not 
only from the lack of motivation to take the perspective of individuals in a foreign culture, but 
also from inaccurate meta-knowledge of the foreign culture.
Keywords
communication, social cognition
There is consensus among psychologists that cross-cultural competence is important in the prac-
tice of psychology. In the 1999 National Multicultural Conference and Summit hosted by 
Divisions 17 (Counseling Psychology), 35 (Society for the Psychology of Women), and 45 
(Society for the Psychological Study of Ethnic Minority Issues) of the American Psychological 
Association (APA), the participants unanimously endorsed resolutions aimed at implementing 
cross-cultural competence in all psychological endeavors, and urged APA to take the lead in see-
ing that cross-cultural competence becomes a defining feature of psychological practice, educa-
tion and training, and research (Sue, Bingham, Porche-Burke, & Vasquez, 1999). Despite the 
strong agreement on its importance, experts in the field have different opinions on what consti-
tute cross-cultural competence (Cunningham, Foster, & Henggeler, 2002).
Cross-cultural competence is a polysemous term, with different meanings to different groups 
of researchers. Nevertheless, most researchers believe that it involves discriminative use of 
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culturally appropriate behavioral strategies in different cultural contexts (e.g., Ang et al., 2007; 
Chiu & Hong, 2005; Hansen, Pepitone-Arreola-Rockwell, & Greene, 2000; Offermann & Phan, 
2002). That is, culturally competent individuals are those who navigate cultural currents smoothly 
by strategically and flexibly displaying culturally appropriate behaviors to pursue valued goals in 
different cultural contexts.
In the current investigation, we focus our analysis on the domain of cross-cultural communi-
cation because of the central role of communication in cross-cultural adjustment and adaptation 
(Chen & Starosta, 1996; Kim, 1988). Although there is agreement that success in cross-cultural 
communication requires motivation and possession of pertinent knowledge and skills (Chen & 
Starosta, 1996; Hammer, Nishida, & Wiseman, 1996; Spitzberg, 1997; Spitzberg & Cupach, 
1989; Wiseman, Hammer, & Nishida, 1989), little is known about which type of knowledge is 
required. Some authors have highlighted the importance of knowing the normative practices of 
other cultures in intercultural interactions (see Spitzberg & Cupach, 1989). However, a recent 
review concludes that overemphasizing “knowing the different ‘Others’ may promote a false 
sense of competence, and even fuel intergroup hostility and reactance” (Chao, Okazaki, & Hong, 
2011, p. 263).
The current research addresses the role of meta-knowledge of culture in discriminative use of 
culturally appropriate communication behaviors across cultural contexts. Drawing on the litera-
ture on the common ground theory of communication (see Krauss & Chiu, 1998), we propose 
that meta-knowledge of culture, defined as knowledge of what members of a certain culture 
know, can significantly influence how individuals formulate communication strategies when 
interacting with members of this culture. Accordingly, what sets competent and incompetent 
communications apart is the accuracy of the underlying meta-knowledge. This view leads to the 
idea that cross-cultural communication often fails not necessarily because individuals do not 
adapt their behaviors to the “expectations” of people in other cultures, but because of their inac-
curate metacognitive knowledge of other cultures. To flesh out our idea, in the following sec-
tions, we will first define what meta-knowledge of culture is. Next, we will elaborate on the role 
of meta-knowledge in intercultural communication and cross-cultural competence, and present 
two studies that tested the role of meta-knowledge in cross-cultural communication.
Meta-Knowledge of Culture
In the emerging field of social metacognition (Briñol & DeMarree, 2012), there is a distinction 
between primary (cognitive) and secondary (metacognitive) thoughts. Primary thoughts refer to 
knowledge about the self and others, including knowledge of the goals, behavioral intentions, 
expectancies, beliefs, and values of the self and others. Secondary thoughts refer to thoughts on 
the contents of one’s own or others’ primary thoughts (Chiu & Bendapudi, 2012). This distinction 
also applies to cultural knowledge: A distinction can be made between primary knowledge of 
culture and secondary, metacognitive knowledge of culture. Primary knowledge of a certain cul-
ture (Culture X) refers to knowledge of what the culture is (e.g., Culture X is individualist; Ang 
et al., 2007). Meta-knowledge of a certain culture refers to knowledge of what people from that 
culture know or prefer. In other words, meta-knowledge is knowledge of people’s knowledge in 
a certain culture rather than general knowledge about the culture itself. Meta-knowledge includes 
objective knowledge (knowledge of the percentage of members of Culture X who know A, B, 
and C, etc.), and subjective knowledge (the extent to which members of Culture X prefer A, B, 
and C, etc.).
Primary knowledge and meta-knowledge of culture are measured differently. For example, in 
the current research, we measured meta-knowledge by assessing participants’ accuracy in esti-
mating the proportional distribution of knowledge in a certain culture (What percent of people 
in Culture X would know A, B, and C, etc.?). In contrast, primary knowledge of culture is usually 
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measured by self-reports (e.g., agreement with items like “I know the legal and economic sys-
tems of other cultures,” and “I know the marriage systems of other cultures”; Ang et al., 2007) 
and performance measures (e.g., the culture assimilator; Brislin, 2009; with items like “What 
cultural differences or set of cultural differences may help someone respond to a critical cross-
cultural incident successfully?”) of how knowledgeable an individual is about different 
cultures.
Meta-Knowledge and Intercultural Communication
Research on social metacognition has focused primarily on thoughts on one’s own thoughts, 
because it is often assumed that “metacognitive processes that lead to changes in the impact of a 
primary thought (e.g., relying more or less on that thought) are more likely to occur if the primary 
thought is in one’s own head” (Briñol & DeMarree, 2012, p. 3). This argument is valid only under 
the restrictive assumption that people do not communicate their thoughts (Chiu & Bendapudi, 
2012). There is clear evidence that in interpersonal communication, people spontaneously con-
sider meta-knowledge of their addressee’s culture when they formulate a message for the latter 
(Fussell & Krauss, 1992).
The common ground theory (Clark, Schreuder, & Buttrick, 1983; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 
1986; Isaacs & Clark, 1987) provides a framework for understanding the role of meta-knowledge 
of culture in cross-cultural communication. According to the theory, communication is a collab-
orative process, whereby communicators collaborate to achieve shared meanings. Communicators 
access what is and what is not in the common ground between them and the addressee, and use 
this assessment to guide message formulation, including in the messages only those elements that 
can be understood with reference to the mutual knowledge, mutual beliefs, and mutual assump-
tions shared with the addressee (Clark et al., 1983; Clark & Marshall, 1981; Clark & Murphy, 
1982; Isaacs & Clark, 1987). Thus, regardless of whether participants are formulating communi-
cative messages or answering the investigator’s questions, they would consider what the 
addressee knows or prefers. If communicative actions are filtered through the lens of the com-
municator’s meta-knowledge, meta-knowledge would also mediate cultural differences in sense-
making and other forms of actions. Furthermore, individuals with more accurate meta-knowledge 
are more culturally competent because they tend to act in a culturally appropriate manner across 
different cultural situations.
Consistent with the common ground theory, research has shown that people have nuanced 
knowledge of what factual information other people in their community possess (Fussell & 
Krauss, 1992; Lau, Chiu, & Lee, 2001). When asked to estimate the proportions of people in 
their community who know certain public figures or landmarks, their estimations corresponded 
closely to the actual proportions of people in their community who know these figures or land-
marks. Furthermore, people spontaneously use their knowledge of the addressee when they 
formulate messages for the addressee. In a referential communication study (Fussell & Krauss, 
1992; see also Lau et al., 2001), one group of participants estimated the proportions of co-
participants who knew the names of some public figures, while another group described the 
same figures so that other students could identify from the descriptions the public figure 
referred to in each description. The results showed that participants in the second group formu-
lated shorter descriptions for a public figure when the first group of participants estimated it to 
be widely known in the community. The process of adjusting one’s communications toward the 
knowledge of the audience to ensure mutual understanding is referred to as audience design. 
Audience design is made possible by the communicator assessing what is and what is not pres-
ent in the common ground between him/herself and the addressee, and subsequently tailoring 
the messages to include only those elements that are mutually known. Although there is evi-
dence for the role of meta-knowledge of the addressee or its community in interpersonal 
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communication within a culture, no known research has directly examined the role of meta-
knowledge of cultures in cross-cultural communication.
We contend that audience design also plays an important part in cross-cultural communica-
tion. When individuals communicate with a foreigner or someone from another culture, they 
would consider what the foreigners know and do not know. Thus, meta-knowledge of cultures 
should affect the message properties (e.g., message length, contents) in cross-cultural communi-
cation. This view is consistent with Clark’s (1996) proposal regarding the effect of the cultural 
background of the audience on message formulation. Based on the community membership of 
the audience, the communicators estimate the proportional distribution of the topic-relevant 
knowledge in the audience’s community and formulate their messages according to the meta-
knowledge of such knowledge in the audience’s community.
This contention has received some preliminary support. In a recent study (Zou et al., 2009), 
Hong Kong Chinese, who are insiders to Chinese culture and Anglo-American culture as a 
result of growing up in a British colony (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martínez, 2000; Lau-
Gesk, 2003), responded to a measure of causal attribution. They rated the extent to which a 
causally ambiguous event can be explained in terms of the internal qualities of the actor—a 
causal explanation that is more popular in the United States than in China (Morris & Peng, 
1994). Prior to answering the causal attribution question, half of the participants learned that the 
investigator was a Chinese from a local university, while the remaining ones learned that the 
investigator was an Anglo-American from Boston University. The participants endorsed an 
internal explanation of the ambiguous event more strongly when they learned that the investiga-
tor was an Anglo-American as opposed to a Chinese. Furthermore, this effect is mediated by the 
meta-knowledge that dispositional causation is more popular among Americans than the Chinese 
(Zou et al., 2009).
Broader Implications for Understanding Cross-Cultural 
Competence
The ability to design and customize behaviors for different cultural audiences is a signature 
behavior of cross-cultural competence. Research has shown that individuals enmeshed in a sec-
ond culture can navigate situations in the second culture like an expert; they interpret and express 
messages in situations in the ways that natives do (Fu, Chiu, Morris, & Young, 2007). More 
important, these bicultural experts can apply their expertise in the two cultures discriminatively 
and automatically to guide interpretations and actions in a particular setting (Fu et al., 2007; 
Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999; Hong et al., 2000; Lau-Gesk, 2003; Ross, Xun, & Wilson, 2002; 
Sui, Zhu, & Chiu, 2007; see also Leung & Chiu, 2010).
Meta-knowledge of culture supports cross-cultural competence because it provides cognitive 
support to discriminative application of cultural expertise by correcting the biases ensued from 
overgeneralized primary knowledge of culture. In keeping with this view, Keesing (1974) holds 
that not every individual in the culture shares precisely the same cultural theories. Thus, state-
ments such as “Culture X is individualist” and “Culture Y is collectivist” are often overgeneral-
izations. Holding essentialist assumptions about cultural differences could promote a false sense 
of competence, and even fuel intergroup hostility and reactance (Chao, Chen, Roisman, & Hong, 
2007; No et al., 2008). Instead, as Keesing (1974) posits, a culturally competent individual is 
someone who can act on the “theory of what his fellows know, believe, and mean, his theory of 
the code being followed, the game being played, in the society into which he was born” (p. 89). 
Recently, some organizational theorists (Huber & Lewis, 2010) have put forward the construct of 
cross-understanding, which refers to knowledge of group members’ mental representations 
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(including knowledge and beliefs) of the group. They argue that cross-understanding as a form of 
meta-knowledge is responsible for many positive outcomes in group interactions.
Several sources of evidence attest to the central role of meta-knowledge in cross-cultural 
competence. First, recent research showed that meta-knowledge of cultures rather than actual 
beliefs or values of the participants mediate many cross-cultural differences in social cognition 
and behaviors (Shteynberg, Gelfand, & Kim, 2009; Zou et al., 2009). For example, Americans 
are more likely to make internal attributions than are the Chinese, not because Americans (vs. the 
Chinese) believe more strongly in dispositional causation, but because they believe that disposi-
tional causation is more widely accepted by other Americans (Zou et al., 2009).
Second, some studies showed that to be able to interact competently with a person from a 
second culture, one also needs to possess meta-knowledge about the second culture. For exam-
ple, in one study, Mainland Chinese students studying in Hong Kong differ among themselves in 
how much they know the relative popularity of different values in Hong Kong society. Those 
who possess more accurate meta-knowledge have more competent social interactions with Hong 
Kong students (Li & Hong, 2001).
In the current investigation, we are interested in the discriminative application of bicultural 
expertise in the domain of cross-cultural communication. To extend the generality of our results 
to different kinds of interpersonal communication, we examined referential communication in 
Study 1 and persuasive communication in Study 2. Referential communication aims at helping 
the addressee determine which item in an array of objects is the topic of conversation (Krauss 
& Chiu, 1998), whereas persuasive communication aims at influencing the behavior of the 
addressee.
Study 1: Referential Communication
In referential communication, individuals would formulate different messages depending on the 
identity of the addressee. For example, a person talking with a stranger will avoid idiosyncratic 
expressions that are unlikely to be part of their common ground (Fussell & Krauss, 1989a, 
1989b). Someone referring to city landmarks is more likely to call them by name when talking 
to people who are familiar with the city than to those who are not (Isaacs & Clark, 1987). 
Nonetheless, how bicultural individuals apply their expertise in two cultures discriminatively to 
guide their communicative actions across cultural contexts has not been systematically investi-
gated. It is also unclear what the psychological processes that support discriminative use of 
communication strategies across cultural contexts are. Study 1 is designed to fill these gaps.
In the current study, we examined whether people would apply culture-appropriate meta-
knowledge in cross-cultural referential communication. In the study, Hong Kong participants 
described landmarks in Hong Kong and New York to either a Hong Kong audience or a New 
York audience. We expected that when the participants formulated messages for an audience, 
they would take the audience’s knowledge of the landmarks into account, generating shorter mes-
sages for New Yorkers when describing landmarks that were more widely known among New 
Yorkers. They would also formulate shorter messages for Hong Kongers when describing land-
marks that were more widely known among Hong Kongers.
Method
Forty Chinese undergraduates (30% males, 70% females) from a public university in Hong Kong 
participated in this study. They received U.S. $8 for their participation.
Photos of 17 landmarks were shown to the participants. In the pilot study, 38 photos of land-
marks were presented to 20 Hong Kong undergraduates from the same university. They were 
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asked to identify the landmarks and to estimate the percentage of undergraduates in their univer-
sity and in a university in New York who could identify the landmarks. Out of the 38 landmarks, 
we selected 14 as our stimuli. Some selected landmarks were rated to be equally familiar to the 
participants in the two cities (e.g., Statue of Liberty and Great Wall). Some were more familiar to 
Hong Kongers than to New Yorkers (e.g., The Hong Kong Cultural Center), some were more 
familiar to New Yorkers than to Hong Kongers (e.g., The Guiggenheim Museum), and some 
were unfamiliar to Hong Kongers and New Yorkers (e.g., Kowloon City Park and St George’s 
Ukrainian Catholic Church). Some landmarks could be easily identified if the participants men-
tioned only the type of architecture to which they belonged (e.g., a bridge). To address this prob-
lem, we added three other landmarks as distractors. However, participants were not required to 
describe the distractors.
In the experiment, participants were first asked to identify the landmarks and then estimate the 
percentage of undergraduates at their own university and the university in New York who could 
identify the landmarks. Finally, participants were asked to describe the landmarks one by one. 
Each participant’s descriptions were tape recorded and later transcribed. For each description, we 
measured its length by counting the number of words in it.
Results and Discussion
We used a multilevel hierarchical model to test our hypothesis. The dependent variable was mes-
sage length. We centered the estimation for Hong Kong students and the estimation for New York 
students at their respective grand means (M = 59.26 and = 47.74 for Hong Kong and American 
students, respectively). At the first (intra-individual) level of the model, we modeled the inter-
cepts (participant’s adjusted mean message length) and the slopes relating message length to 
estimations for Hong Kongers and New Yorkers as random effects. In the second (between-sub-
jects) level, we included audience as the predictor.
The overall adjusted mean message length was 72.29 words. There was a significant interac-
tion between audience and mean estimated identification rates of the landmarks in Hong Kong, 
b = −.33, t(425) = −3.93, p < .001. The interaction between audience and mean estimated identi-
fication rates of the landmarks among New Yorkers was also significant, b = .19, t(425) = −2.49, 
p = .01. As illustrated in Figure 1, the message intended for a Hong Kong audience was .18 words 
shorter when the estimated identifiability of the landmark to Hong Kong people increased by 1% 
(p < .001). However, the message intended for a Hong Kong audience was not related to the 
estimated identifiability of the landmark to New Yorkers (b = .08, ns). In contrast, when the mes-
sage was intended for a New Yorker, the message length was .27 words shorter (p < .01) with 
every percent increase in the estimated identifiability of the landmark to New Yorkers. The mes-
sage intended for a Hong Kong audience was not related to the estimated identifiability of the 
landmark to New Yorkers (b = .18, ns).1
In short, the results show that people spontaneously use their meta-knowledge of the culture 
of the audience to guide their communicative behaviors. They base their message formulation on 
knowledge of what in-group members know when they interact with in-group members, and on 
knowledge of what out-group members know when they interact with out-group members. When 
they think that their audience is familiar with the object of communication (e.g., a landmark), 
they formulate a shorter message (e.g., including only the name of the landmark in the descrip-
tion: “the Statue of Liberty”), expecting the audience to be able to correctly identify the landmark 
from the brief description. In contrast, when they think that their audience is unfamiliar with the 
object of communication, they formulate a relatively lengthy description of the visible features 
of the object (e.g., instead of just naming the landmark, they include detailed information on the 
visual features of the building).
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Study 2
The objective of the current study is to extend the generality of Study 1’s results. First, we 
replaced the referential communication task with a persuasive communication task to extend our 
results across different types of intercultural interactions. Second, instead of assessing meta-
knowledge of objective knowledge, we assessed that of subjective knowledge (e.g., knowledge 
of the distribution of psychological characteristics in a culture).
We chose regulatory focus as our target psychological characteristic because it has been 
found to mediate important American−Chinese differences in social cognition and behaviors 
(Lalwani, Shrum, & Chiu, 2009; Zou et al., 2009). According to the regulatory focus theory, 
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Figure 1. Relationship between mean estimated identifiability for Hong Kongers (EstHK) and New 
Yorkers (EstNY) and length of the descriptions for Hong Kong and New York audiences.
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there are two distinct foci in self-regulation: A promotion focus is primarily concerned with 
maximizing positive outcomes and a prevention focus is primarily concerned with minimizing 
negative outcomes (Higgins, 1997). People who are promotion-focused eagerly pursue gains or 
successes. Promotion-oriented individuals are motivated by their hopes and aspirations, and 
they scrutinize their social world for information that bears on the pursuit of success (Lockwood, 
Jordan, & Kunda, 2002). In contrast, people with a prevention focus strive to avoid negative 
outcomes. Driven by the need to feel secure and to meet their obligations, these individuals are 
primarily concerned with preventing failures or losses, and their information processing and 
interpersonal tactics are geared toward avoiding undesirable outcomes (Higgins, Roney, Crowe, 
& Hymes, 1994).
The study was conducted in a U.S. campus in the American Midwest, where the majority of 
students are European Americans. Our participants were European American and Chinese stu-
dents studying in this university. Given the minority status of the Chinese students, they have 
more frequent exposure to European American culture than European American students have to 
Chinese culture. The asymmetrical exposure of the two student groups to each other’s culture 
allows us to examine cross-cultural behavioral flexibility in persuasive communication as a func-
tion of the amount of intercultural exposure that takes place within the same environment.
To minimize the impact of demand characteristics and to assess accuracy in the meta-knowl-
edge of promotion and prevention focus in American and Chinese cultures, we obtained informa-
tion of the actual and perceived popularity of the two regulatory foci in separate samples of 
Chinese and European American undergraduates. In a third independent sample of Chinese and 
American undergraduates, we measured the inclination to use promotion-focused arguments in 
persuasive communication as a function of the cultural membership of the audience.
Method
Actual popularity of regulatory focus. We obtained data on the actual popularity of promotion and 
prevention focus from Zou and colleagues (2009, Study 3). In this study, 120 European Ameri-
can undergraduates from the same university where we conducted the main study (45% men) and 
85 Chinese undergraduates (29% men) in Beijing completed the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire 
(RFQ, Higgins et al., 2001). The RFQ measures promotion and prevention focus. Some items in 
the questionnaire are phrased in the form of a statement. For these items, a participant rates his 
or her agreement with the statements each on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (cer-
tainly false) to 5 (certainly true). The remaining items are phrased in the form of a question. For 
these items, a participant indicates how often he or she acts or thinks in that particular way each 
on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (never or seldom) to 5 (very often). This measure 
displayed acceptable reliability (for the Chinese: αprevention = .80, αpromotion = .63; for Americans: 
αprevention = .76, αpromotion = .68). American participants’ promotion focus (MAmerican = 3.81, SD = 
0.70) was significantly higher than that of Chinese participants (MChinese = 3.42, SD = 0.63), p < 
.001, F(1, 203) = 3.38, ηp
2 = .06. The prevention focus does not differ across the two cultures 
(MAmerican = 3.43, SD = 0.48; MChinese = 3.42, SD = 0.62).
Perceived popularity of regulatory focus. To assess the perceived popularity of the two regulatory 
foci, we recruited a sample of European American students (N = 48, 59.1% male) and Chinese 
students (N = 54, 42.1% male) from the same campus where the main study was conducted. With 
one exception, all American students were born in the United States. All Chinese students were 
born in Mainland China, Hong Kong, or Taiwan. The Chinese students had lived in the United 
States for an average of 3.33 years.
The participants answered minimally altered versions of the RFQ that tap perceived popular-
ity of the two regulatory foci among Americans and the Chinese. They rated the extent to which 
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the RFQ statements were widely endorsed and the actions widely practiced among Americans 
and the Chinese, for example: “Growing up, would most Americans/Chinese ever ‘cross the line’ 
by doing what their parents would not tolerate?”; “Did most Americans/Chinese get on their 
parents’ nerves often when they were growing up?” Each participant answered questions (in a 
counterbalanced order) pertaining to the perceived popularity of promotion and prevention regu-
latory focus among Americans and the Chinese.
To ensure that American and Chinese participants understood the meaning of the two regula-
tory foci, after they had completed the perceived popularity measures, they were presented with 
brief descriptions of four individuals and asked to predict how each of these individuals would 
respond to the RFQ. The four profiles described an American or a Chinese who was motivated 
by aspirations and hopes, and an American or a Chinese who was motivated by the needs to feel 
secure and to meet their obligations. If the participants understood the meanings of the regulatory 
focus, regardless of their own cultural membership and the cultural membership of the target, 
they should expect the promotion-oriented targets to score higher on promotion focus than on 
prevention focus, and vice versa for the prevention-oriented targets. The reliabilities of the 12 
sets of ratings (perceived promotion and prevention of Americans, the Chinese, and the four 
specific targets) ranged from .61 to .80.
Choice of persuasive arguments. Another sample of European American students (N = 43, 53.5% 
male) and Chinese students (N = 44, 37.2% male) in the same campus participated in the “persua-
sion study.” With three exceptions, all American participants were born in the United States. With 
one exception, all Chinese participants were born in Mainland China, Hong Kong, or Taiwan. 
The Chinese participants had lived in the United States for an average of 22.5 months.
We measured the choice of persuasive arguments by asking participants to recall a past inci-
dent in which they persuaded their American (or Chinese, between-subjects factor) friend to do 
something and wrote down the arguments they used to persuade their friend. All participants 
recalled at least two arguments. Coders who were blind to the participants’ experimental condi-
tion counted the number of gain-oriented arguments (0 to 2) in the first two recalled arguments 
to form a measure of the tendency to use gain-oriented arguments.
After completing this task, the participants responded to a demographic survey. In this survey, 
we asked the participants to report the languages they could speak, write, and read, and rate on 
an 11-point scale (from 0 to 10) their level of liking for American and Chinese cultures. The 
participants were also instructed to list five favorite musicians, and for each musician, indicate 
his or her nationality. For each participant, we counted the number of musicians on the list who 
were foreign musicians (non-Americans for the Americans and non-Chinese for the Chinese).
Results and Discussion
Intercultural exposure. Consistent with our assumption, all Chinese participants, compared with 
62.8% of Americans, could speak two or more languages, χ2(df = 1, N = 87) = 26.28, p < .001. 
Americans, liked American culture (M = 8.48) more than the Chinese did (M = 5.25), t(84) = 
7.58, p < .001. In contrast, the Chinese liked Chinese culture (M = 8.07) more than Americans 
did (M = 2.47), t(76) = 12.31, p < .001. More important, the Chinese like American culture more 
than Americans liked Chinese culture, as reflected in the significant interaction of participant 
culture and culture of liking, F(1, 76) = 133.69, p < .001.
The Chinese (M = 1.68) also favored more foreign music than did the Americans (M = 0.70), 
t(85) = 3.59, p < .005. Furthermore, for Americans, having more favorite foreign musicians was 
positively correlated with liking for Chinese culture (r = .55, p < .01) and negatively correlated 
with liking for American culture (r = −.30, p < .05). For the Chinese, having more favorite for-
eign musicians was negatively correlated with liking for Chinese culture (r = −.29, p < .05) and 
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not related to liking for American culture (r = .15, ns). This result shows that having more favor-
ite foreign musicians is related to cultural preferences. This is particularly the case for Americans, 
who can choose to interact with the minority.
Perceived popularity of regulatory focus. To ensure that American and Chinese participants under-
stood the meanings of promotion and prevention focus, we performed a 2 (Participant Culture) × 
2 (Target Regulatory Focus) × 2 (Target Culture) × 2 (Measure: Promotion or Prevention Focus) 
mixed design analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the estimated regulatory focus of the four tar-
gets, with the last three factors as within-subjects factors. None of the effects associated with 
participant culture and target culture were significant (Fs < 1). The Target Regulatory Focus × 
Measure interaction was significant, F(1, 101) = 445.72, p < .0001. The promotion-oriented tar-
get was estimated to have higher promotion score (MAmerican = 3.84; MChinese = 3.84) than preven-
tion score (MAmerican = 2.79; MChinese = 2.70), t(47) = 14.15 for Americans and 13.89 for the 
Chinese, respectively, ps < .001. The prevention-oriented target was estimated to have higher 
prevention score (MAmerican = 3.70; MChinese = 3.63) than promotion score (MAmerican = 2.79; MChinese 
= 2.70), t(47) = 12.22 for Americans and 12.63 for the Chinese, respectively, ps < .001. These 
results helped to establish cross-cultural equivalence in the understanding of the constructs of 
promotion and prevention focus.
Next, we examined group differences in the estimated endorsements of promotion and pre-
vention focus among Americans and the Chinese. We performed a 2 (Participant Culture) × 2 
(Target Culture) × 2 (Measure) mixed design analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the estimated 
regulatory focus of Americans and the Chinese, with the last two factors as within-subjects fac-
tors. The three-way interaction was significant, F(1, 100) = 6.18, p = .01. We interpreted other 
lower-order significant effects in light of this significant three-way interaction. American partici-
pants expected the Chinese (M = 3.60) to be more promotion-focused than Americans (M = 3.48), 
t(47) = 2.04, p < .05. This perception was inaccurate given that the actual promotion scores of the 
Americans were higher than those of the Chinese. In contrast, the Chinese accurately perceived 
Americans to have higher promotion scores (M = 3.52) than the Chinese (M = 3.22), t(53) = 3.37, 
p = .001. This result is consistent with our argument that the Chinese have more exposure to 
Americans than Americans to the Chinese, and such exposure could have produced more accu-
rate meta-knowledge among the Chinese of the cultural differences in the endorsements of pro-
motion focus. The Chinese and the Americans, however, incorrectly expected the Chinese to 
have higher prevention scores than did Americans (for American participants: MChinese = 3.67, 
MAmerican = 2.96; for the Chinese participants: MChinese = 3.45, MAmerican = 2.73), ts > 6.56, ps < 
.001.
Choice of persuasive arguments. Results of a Participant Culture × Target Culture ANOVA per-
formed on the number of gain-oriented arguments used in persuasive communication revealed a 
significant two-way interaction, F(1, 83) = 4.02, p < .05, η2 = .044. When the friend was an 
American, the Chinese participants used more gain-oriented arguments (M = 0.52) than did 
American participants (M = 0.09), t(43) = 2.40, p = .01. The Chinese also used more gain-ori-
ented arguments when they tried to persuade their American friend than they did their Chinese 
friend (M = 0.24), whereas Americans used more gain-oriented arguments when they tried to 
persuade their Chinese friend (M = 0.29) than they did their American friend. Although both dif-
ferences were not significant (ps = .16), the overall pattern was consistent with the finding that 
Americans expected the Chinese to be more promotion-focused than Americans, and the Chinese 
expected Americans to be more promotion-focused than the Chinese.
As a robust test, we controlled for the participants’ liking of American and Chinese cultures 
before we evaluated the effects of participant culture and target culture. The effect of liking for 
American culture was nonsignificant (b = −0.06, t = −1.75, p = .08), and so was the effect of lik-
ing for Chinese culture (b = −0.02, t = −0.45, p = .65). The interaction of participant culture and 
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target culture remained significant after controlling for the effects of liking for American and 
Chinese cultures, F(1, 72) = 4.34, p = .04.
General Discussion
The results of the two studies reported here provided general support for the role of meta-knowl-
edge in the use of discriminative and culturally sensitive strategies in cross-cultural communica-
tion. Display of discriminativeness and cultural sensitivity when interacting with people from 
different cultures is a signature behavior of cross-cultural competence (Ang et al., 2007; Chiu & 
Hong, 2005). Given the central role of cross-cultural communication in cross-cultural adaptation 
(Kim, 1988), our results underscore the importance of meta-knowledge in cross-cultural 
competence.
To elaborate, our results show that in referential and persuasive communication, communica-
tors spontaneously appropriate pertinent meta-knowledge to guide message formulation for dif-
ferent cultural audiences. In referential communication, communicators produce more concise 
referential messages when they expect knowledge of the referent to be more widely shared in the 
culture of the audience (Study 1). In persuasive communication, communicators produce more 
gain-oriented arguments when they expect promotion focus to be a relatively popular self-regu-
latory preference in the culture of the audience (Study 2). This pattern of communicative behav-
iors is consistent with the principle of audience design in the common ground theory (Clark et al., 
1983; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Isaacs & Clark, 1987).
Implications for Cross-Cultural Competence
Our findings have an interesting implication for understanding the nature of cross-cultural com-
petence. In Study 2, the European American students took the cultural perspective of their audi-
ence when formulating a persuasive message for the audience. Nonetheless, because they held 
erroneous meta-knowledge about self-regulatory preferences, they included more gain-oriented 
arguments in message intended for the Chinese than the American audience. This result implies 
that when people possess accurate meta-knowledge, perspective taking would enhance the qual-
ity of intercultural interaction. This implication is consistent with the past finding that accuracy 
in meta-knowledge is associated with better quality of intercultural interactions (Li & Hong, 
2001). However, perspective taking does not guarantee production of culturally sensitive mes-
sages in cross-cultural communication. Specifically, if the communicators have inaccurate meta-
knowledge, perspective taking is likely to promote culturally inappropriate communication 
strategies. Communicators can produce culturally sensitive communication strategies only if 
they have accurate meta-knowledge and adopt perspective taking. This interactive effect between 
cultural perspective taking and meta-knowledge on the quality of cross-cultural interaction 
deserves future investigation.
Implications for Understanding Cultural Differences and Processes
Our results also shed light on the recent findings on the role of intersubjective knowledge in 
explaining cultural differences in cognition and behaviors (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, 
& Wan, 2010). A growing body of evidence shows that cultural differences in social cognition 
and behaviors are mediated by perceived distributions of cultural knowledge rather than actual 
differences in the preferences of the pertinent cultural groups (Shteynberg et al., 2009; Wan, 
Chiu, Peng, & Tam, 2007; Wan, Chiu, Tam, et al., 2007; Zou et al., 2009). For example, cultural 
differences in attribution are better explained by cultural differences in the perceived popularity 
of the belief in dispositional causation than by cultural differences in the actual preferences for 
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this belief (Zou et al., 2009). Some researchers (Fleming, Darley, Hilton, & Kojetin, 1990; Hilton, 
1995) have argued that even seemingly private social cognitions (such as attribution) measured 
in a research laboratory are actually conversational behaviors directed toward specific audiences. 
If the research participants consider reporting their attribution to the investigator as a conversa-
tional act, they may adjust their message to the meta-knowledge of the investigator. From this 
perspective, it is not surprising that meta-knowledge would mediate cross-cultural differences in 
attribution style. This idea is consistent with the past finding that bicultural participants make 
different causal explanations for an ambiguous event depending on the cultural identity of the 
investigator, and the finding that meta-knowledge mediated the response shift in attribution (Zou 
et al., 2009).
Future Research Directions and Conclusion
Given the important role of meta-knowledge of culture in cross-cultural competence, it would be 
interesting to find out in future research the experiential foundation of meta-knowledge. 
Nickerson (1999) suggested that people assess what others know through various means. First, 
they can make direct observation and explicit queries (e.g., “Do you know so and so . . .”). 
Second, people can base their estimation on the immediate physical context and past experiences 
that they share with the audience. According to the Multiple-Trace Model (Hintzman, 1988) in 
the frequency judgment literature, each experience with a stimulus leaves in the memory an inde-
pendent memory trace. As the number of experiences with the stimulus event increases, the 
number of traces for that event also increases. Thus, people are able to form judgments of fre-
quency even in the absence of the intention to do so. This model has received consistent empiri-
cal support. For example, in one study (Howell, 1973), participants were shown a list of words 
presented at different frequencies. Half of the participants were told the experiment was about 
frequency judgment and half of them were told the experiment was about word recall. In both 
conditions, estimations of the presentation frequencies of the words were in proportion to the 
actual presentation frequencies. More importantly there was no significant difference in the per-
formance of the two groups. That is, regardless of whether the participants were told to focus 
intentionally on the presentation frequency of the words or not, their performance was the same. 
This illustrates that information about the frequency of occurrence of different events can be 
acquired through an automatic and unintentional process (see also Zacks, Hasher, & Sanft, 1982). 
We suggest future research to examine how this automatic on-line update of frequency judgment 
provides the experiential basis of meta-knowledge of meaningful psychological tendencies and 
behaviors in a given culture.
As another future research direction, it is worth noting that meta-knowledge contains knowl-
edge about the central tendency and the amount of variability in the proportional distribution of 
knowledge in a culture. Thus, individuals with nuanced meta-knowledge is aware of how widely 
distributed a certain piece of knowledge or preference is as well as the amount of intracultural 
variability of the knowledge in a culture. Consistent with this view, some models of cross-
cultural competence (e.g., Chiu & Hong, 2005) view awareness of intercultural differences and 
intracultural variability in social knowledge as equally important contributors to cross-cultural 
competence. The current investigation has focused on meta-knowledge of central tendencies in 
the distribution of social knowledge. Future research should explore how meta-knowledge of the 
amount of variability in the knowledge distribution within a culture affects cross-cultural 
competence.
In summary, the current research shows that cross-cultural communication is a collaborative 
process, in which individuals coordinate to construct shared representation of the reality. For this 
to be possible, each communicator must formulate their messages according to their meta-
knowledge of the addressee or the addressee’s cultural community. Accordingly, meta-knowledge 
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is an important experience-grounded psychological factor that plays a major role in the cultural 
processes underlying cross-cultural competence.
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Note
1. Audience had no effect on the message length; the main effect of audience was not significant, b = 
−17.28, t(425) = −1.40, p = .16. There was also a significant main effect of mean estimated identifi-
cation rates of the landmarks in Hong Kong on the length of the descriptions [b = 0.18, t(37) = 3.06, 
p = .004]. For every percent increase in the estimated identifiability of the landmarks among Hong 
Kongers, the message was 0.18 words longer. There was also a negative association between mean 
estimated identifiability of the landmarks in New York and the length of the descriptions [b = −0.27, 
t(37) = −5.04, p < .0001]: With every percent increase in the estimated identifiability of the landmarks 
in New York, the message was 0.27 words shorter. We interpreted these main effects in the context of 
the significant interactions.
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